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Reliance Based Damages at ICSID 
 
 
by David Collins∗ 
 
Introduction 
Compensation for the nationalization of foreign investment has been called “one of the 
most controversial areas of international law”1largely because of the wide range of 
remedies that are employed by various legal systems for breach of contract as well as for 
interference with property rights.  In awarding damages resulting from investment 
disputes between private investors and foreign states, tribunals of the International Center 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’) generally assesses compensation 
according to the estimated lost profits the injured investor would have derived from the 
investment, which embodies the familiar “expectation measure” of American contract 
law.  However, on occasion ICSID tribunals have granted recovery for actual costs of the 
investment, or damnum emergens as they are known in international law, much as a 
domestic court might award “reliance measure” damages.  While the reasoning for the 
tribunal’s decision to fix damages according to losses incurred as opposed to (or 
sometimes in addition to2) gains foregone is often unclear, there is sound economic 
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 2 
rationale for a reliance-based standard of compensation.  Most importantly, the error 
costs of imperfect damages based upon the level of actual investment should be lower 
than those derived from other methods, and secondarily, confidentiality of sensitive 
information is secured.  Both of these advantages create incentives for further foreign 
direct investment, which is one of the primary objectives of the ICSID Convention and its 
dispute settlement system.   
This article will examine several instances where ICSID tribunals have awarded 
damnum emergens and illustrate how this choice is generally economically efficient.  It 
will begin by outlining standards of damage remedies that are commonly employed in 
international law and will conclude with some criticisms of the reliance measure in the 
investment context.  As this article is forum-focused it will not examine reliance-based 
remedies in international investment law under other regimes in any detail, such as 
UNCITRAL arbitrations or under the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.  Moreover, this article 
will not discuss the highly contentious issue of asset valuation methods used in 
international investment arbitration3 which are rightly viewed as secondary to the finding 
of the compensation standard applicable to the dispute.4  Similarly, the limitations of 
remoteness and foreseeability which feature in the assessment of damages both in 
common law and international systems will not be explored. An attempt to define the 
term investment directly is beyond the scope of this article, although some examples of 
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the types of expenses that ICSID tribunals will recognize when granting recovery will be 
seen.  Finally this article will not directly consider the controversial issue of when state 
regulatory actions amount to an expropriation5 for the purposes of assessing 
compensation.  A brief introduction of ICSID is warranted. 
ICSID was established by the multilateral Convention on the Settlement of 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States which entered into force in 1966 
and is part of the World Bank, located in Washington DC, USA, although its proceedings 
may take place elsewhere.  Generally speaking, ICSID provides facilities for the 
conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and 
nationals of other Contracting States, although under its Additional Facility rules, states 
which are not party to the Convention may now use ICSID tribunals for dispute 
settlement, as well as for certain other fact-finding proceedings.  Independent arbitral 
tribunals are constituted for each case under the procedural framework provided by the 
ICSID Convention and using the center’s facilities.  Arbitration or conciliation under 
ICSID is entirely voluntary, but once consent is given then it cannot be withdrawn 
unilaterally by either side. There are currently more than 150 countries which have 
ratified the convention and the caseload of the tribunals has increased substantially in 
recent years largely due to the proliferation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)6.  In 
the past decade ICSID tribunals have resolved many disputes resulting notably from the 
economic crisis in Argentina as well as the privatization initiatives in Eastern Europe.  
Typically ICSID disputes relate to difficulties encountered by Western corporations 
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which have invested in large projects in the developing world due to political upheavals 
in those countries. 
Before embarking on the discussion of relevant ICSID decisions, let it be said that 
in establishing remedies in international investment arbitration, the investment contract or 
BIT is of paramount importance.  The first step in the tribunal’s assessment of an 
appropriate measure damages, and indeed its first step with respect to issues of 
jurisdiction and liability, is to examine the text of the investment contract or relevant 
treaty itself.  This is because under the ICSID Convention the tribunal is required to 
“decide a dispute in accordance which such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties” 
and if there is no agreement as to governing law, the tribunal “shall apply the law of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such 
rules of international law as may be applicable.”7 Most of the now more than two 
thousand BITs require some form of prompt compensation for expropriations or other 
breaches of investment contracts8, as do multilateral treaties such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), under which disputes are also brought before ICSID9.  
It is also not uncommon for a concession contract leave open the nature of damages that 
will be available for breach, in which case the fixing of damages is expressly granted to 
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the ICSID tribunal under the Convention10.  In such cases the tribunal will point to the 
law of the investor state or, more problematically as we shall see in the next section, to 
the principles of international law11.  Any of the above categories can lead the tribunal to 
a consideration damages linked to the extent of actual investment, however the interplay 
of sources of authority for principles of international law has rendered remedies in 
international commercial arbitration highly uncertain, especially in the case of state 
actions such as expropriation12 which are often the very type of disputes brought before 
ICSID.   
 
Assessing Damages in International Law 
Although it is conceded that there is no clear principle of compensation nationalization in 
international law13, there is almost universal consensus among international tribunals that 
the purpose of damages for breach of contract is to place the injured party in the position 
it would have been in had the contract been performed as promised14.  International 
jurisprudence appears to suggest that compensation must repair, as far as possible by 
financial means, the damage caused by the illegal act and this may include both losses 
incurred as well as gains foregone.  Such a goal was pronounced by the Permanent Court 
of Justice in the Chorzow Factory case:  reparation must “wipe out all the consequences 
of the illegal act and re-stablish the situation that would, in all probability, have existed 
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had that act not been committed”.15  This principle of restitutio in integrum is mirrored in 
the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility which states 
that the state responsible for an internationally wrongful act “is under an obligation to 
compensate for the damage caused thereby” and such compensation shall cover “any 
financially assessable damage including lost profits in so far as it is established.”16  With 
respect to breaches of contract in particular, international commercial arbitration 
similarly established the purpose of damages should be to “place the party to whom they 
are awarded in the same pecuniary position that they would have been in had the contract 
been performed”.17  
Civil law systems’ terminology regarding damages are derived from the Roman 
law principles of lucrum cessans (gains prevented) and damnum emergens (actual loss 
suffered) and some combination of these two heads of damages is typically applied in 
international fora to achieve the objective restitutio in integrum18.  Lucrum cessans 
essentially mirrors the primary objective of standard damages remedies in American 
contract law, which is the fulfillment of expectations that have been induced by the 
making of a promise – the so-called expectation measure.  This is an amount of money 
that would put the injured party in the position they would have been in had the contract 
been properly performed, or which would give them the benefit of the bargain.19 In the 
context of international investment law, the expectation measure is properly viewed as 
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the loss of profits that would have been earned from the investment, but for the 
interference of the host state.  Lost future profits were awarded, for example, in the 
Sapphire case noted above, despite the inherently speculative nature of the investment 
concession.20 The second chief category or head of damages for breach of contract in 
international law, damnum emergens, is for the most part conceptually similar to the 
reliance measure21, which compensates an injured party for any actions they undertook to 
their detriment in anticipation of the other party’s contractual performance which result in 
a loss because of breach.  Under this measure damages may be recovered for an amount 
representing the extent of the investments incurred for the purposes of performance.22  In 
the context of international investment law, the reliance measure is best seen in awards 
representing actual or direct investment costs incurred by the investor.  Terms such as 
“sunk costs”, “wasted costs” or “out of pocket expenses” are also used variously to 
describe this remedy with limited practical differences.  
While both lucrum cessans and damnum emergens are often claimed by the 
injured party, and often both awarded,23 damnum emergens is typically awarded as an 
alternative when lost profits as per the expectation or lucrum cessans approach cannot be 
measured with sufficient certainty.  Clearly parties whose investment activities have been 
adversely affected by the actions or omissions of the states in which they invest may 
receive compensation commensurate with their lost profits before an ICSID tribunal.  
Moreover, such amounts need not be demonstrated with complete certainty and recovery 
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will not be denied solely because the quantum is difficult to determine.24  However the 
tribunal has also cautioned that compensation for lost profits must not be too remote or 
speculative.  ICSID tribunals are reluctant to award damages based on lost profits if such 
profits would be highly speculative and result in an amount that was grossly 
disproportionate to the sum that was invested.25  In particular ICSID tribunals are 
reluctant to award damages for lost profits for a new industry or one where there is 
limited record of profits.26 On the other hand, damnum emergens appears to be always 
recoverable.27   
 Although the assessment of damnum emergens has been praised by Gray as 
straightforward28 in a way that lost profits is not, evaluating the extent of actual 
investments in a particular project is not as orthodox as it might initially appear.  In the 
words of one ICSID tribunal: “it is a matter of controversy whether to use funds invested 
as a measure of the value of the investment.”29  This tension may rest upon the often 
unappreciated difference between the value of the investment that has been seized by a 
foreign state and the associated damages resulting therefrom, such as, for example, a lost 
future income stream.  This key paradigm is itself founded upon the important distinction 
between compensation resulting from a lawful government expropriation and damages 
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for an illegal act such as an unlawful expropriation or a breach of contract30.  While the 
latter might properly require assessment by reference to expectation losses, the former 
may be properly within the sphere of reliance-based damages31.  However as we shall 
see, the ICSID tribunals that have awarded actual cost of investment do not appear to 
acknowledge this distinction when deciding upon a standard for assessing damages.  
Rather, the tribunals seem most concerned with accuracy and the avoidance of 
speculation through credible verification of amounts invested.  Thus the primary 
objective in the remedy selection process is one of precision, which may be explained 
according to an underlying motive of efficiency, as we shall discuss in Section XX.  
Hojer has suggested that ICSID tribunals may view actual investments as a “starting 
point”32 when assessing an appropriate remedy, but as we shall now see ultimately the 
decision to implement a reliance-based remedy will depend upon the contents of the 
particular investment contract or BIT, the circumstances of each case, the type of 
investment, and importantly the nature of the violation, such as whether it involves an 
expropriation or the violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard that appears in 
most investment agreements.   
 
Reliance-Based Damages:  Recovery for Actual Investments at ICSID 
                                                 
30
 Christine Gray Judicial Remedies in International Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1987) at 194, noting that 
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Arbitration” 4:6 Transnational Dispute Management 1 at 4.  Sornarajah notes that the seminal dicta from 
Chorzow Factory was limited to unlawful takings, a fact that is not appreciated by many legal scholars: 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTat 453-456. 
31
 Sornarajah at 470, referring to principles enunciated in Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran 
(1982) 1 Iran-US Claims Tribunal 493. 
32
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Christian J Tams eds The International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): 
Taking Stock After 40 Years (Nomos, Frankfurt, 2007) at 101 
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In some cases the tribunal has completely ignored a claimant’s request for damages based 
upon out-of-pocket expenses incurred through their activities, preferring instead to focus 
on the compensation of lost profits.33  The tribunal has also noted that compensation for 
investment costs should be considered normal, stating: “previous arbitral tribunals … 
have overwhelmingly favoured the award of lost investment costs” a reference to the 
LIAMCO ad hoc oil concession arbitration which itself urged that at a minimum damnum 
emergens should be awarded in international investment disputes, representing the value 
of tangible goods and the cost of installations as well as unknown expenses.34  In the very 
same dispute, the ICSID tribunal commented that the determination of a lost investment 
is a “relatively simple operation”, unlike the calculation of lost profits.  In contrast to the 
enormous quantity of ICSID jurisprudence regarding the valuation of lost profits for the 
purposes of damages awards, there is startling little ICSID case law concerning 
investment based compensation.  Review of this limited material reveals that the 
determination of lost investments at ICSID is essentially an accounting exercise, the 
principle difficulty of which is the veracity and reliability of the evidence presented 
regarding expenditures.  
 Actual investment expenses were recovered by the claimant in Wena Hotels Ltd v 
Arab Republic of Egypt35 as an alternative to an award for lost profits to compensate for 
the expropriation of hotels in Cairo and Luxor.  Lost profits were unrecoverable both 
because there was insufficient record of profits before the seizure on which to base an 
                                                 
33
 See eg,  Maritime International Nominees Establishment ("MINE") (Claimant) v Republic of Guinea 
(Defendant) ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4 (AWARD) 
34
 ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2 (AWARD) Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation [LETCO] (Claimant) v 
Republic of Liberia, ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2 (Award) citing LIAMCO v Libya 20 ILM 1 (1981). 
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estimate and also because the amount claimed (₤46) was grossly disproportionate to the 
amount invested (₤9).  In fixing damages based instead on the claimant’s actual 
investments in the hotel projects, the tribunal added that the fact that expenses were 
incurred by the claimant’s affiliates was immaterial, although adjustments were made to 
account for erroneous double counting of certain unidentified expenses.  This 
determination survived an evidentiary challenge at a later annulment proceeding – the 
respondent’s allegation that various financial documents were missing was rejected, the 
tribunal noting that it may assess the credibility and completeness of evidence at its own 
discretion.36 This case underlines the importance of reliable evidence in the establishment 
of a cost-incurred remedy.  
A reliance-based measure of damages was contemplated by ICSID in its high-
profile arbitration of a NAFTA dispute between the Metalclad, the subsidiary of a 
Mexican corporation, and the United States regarding the latter’s interference with a 
landfill development project through both unfair treatment and expropriation.  As an 
alternative to the fair market value of the assessment, the claimant corporation proposed 
the actual investment in the landfill as an appropriate means of fixing compensation.  The 
tribunal viewed actual investments as the correct mechanism for ascertaining 
compensation because a claim of market value based on future profits could not be 
adequately substantiated by reference to past performance as there was insufficient record 
of the landfill’s prior commercial activity.  In arriving at this decision the tribunal cited 
similar practice by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, which had used a value of investment 
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method to gauge compensation in the absence of a realistic estimate of future profits37.  
The actual investment method was also seen as being consistent with the celebrated 
guidelines from the International Court of Justice in the Chorzow Factory case which, as 
noted above, established that compensation should “wipe out the consequences of the 
illegal act and re-stablish the situation which would in all probability have existed if that 
act had not been committed.”38  The claimant used US federal income tax documentation 
and an independent auditor’s reports to substantiate its investment costs which included 
such items as personnel, insurance, travel, telephone, accounting and legal, consulting, 
interest, office, property, plant and equipment costs.  The tribunal adopted a more 
stringent approach to preparatory costs, denying recovery for costs incurred in the year 
prior to Metalclad’s purchase of the company which owned the landfill because such 
costs were seen as too remote to the investment.  This aspect of the ruling illustrates that 
limiting principles of damages familiar to common law jurisdictions are relevant at 
ICSID tribunals. 
The ICSID tribunal elected to assess damages based on the reliance measure in 
the recent PSEG Global Inc. (Claimant), Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited 
Sirketi (Claimant) v Turkey (Respondent)39.  As an alternative to a claim for lost profits, 
claimants PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi 
argued that they deserved compensation in the amount of investment by the Turkish 
government for its legislative interference with the companies’ operations of the newly 
privatized energy sector in Turkey’s central region.  The particular out of pocket 
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expenses cited included costs of preparing the power plant project as well as mine 
studies, contract negotiations and financing, environmental costs, permits and license 
fees, and legal and consulting fees.  The respondent Turkey contended that more than half 
of the claimed costs were incurred by other companies actually unrelated to the energy 
project and should consequently not be compensated.  More importantly, Turkey argued 
that investment costs should not be awarded because the project would have ultimately 
led to a loss, a restriction on the application of the reliance remedy seen in American 
contract law40.  In expanding upon the precise expenses for which compensation could be 
paid, the tribunal stated:  
 
An investment can take many forms before actually reaching the construction stage, 
including most notably the cost of negotiations and other preparatory work …even in 
connection with pre- investment expenditures, particularly when … there is a valid and 
binding Contract duly executed between the parties.41 
 
The tribunal awarded investment-based damages of approximately US $9M, although 
only those expenses actually incurred by the claimants themselves were included, not 
those by related companies, and the award was diminished slightly because of erroneous 
double-counting for certain smaller expenses. The cost of contract negotiation itself and 
legal fees therein, meaning some expenses incurred even before the existence of any legal 
obligation, were also viewed as a legitimate expenses deserving of compensation.42  
Previous ICSID case law, notably Metalclad, has suggested that preparatory expenses 
prior to the execution of the investment contract will not be recoverable, even if they 
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 Recovery for detrimental reliance incurred before contract formation was controversially permitted by 
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could be considered part of the investment.  Whether or not such costs are recoverable 
may, of course, depend on the wording of the particular investment agreement.43  It is 
noteworthy that legal fees incurred in establishing an investment (rather than disputing 
losses from an affected investment) have been explicitly labeled “out of pocket” costs by 
another ICSID tribunal and compensated accordingly.44 The tribunal’s decision to award 
the investment costs appeared to be based primarily on the fact that the amounts claimed 
had been subjected to a careful and credible audit.  That the electricity project may have 
ultimately led to a loss had it been completed was influential in preventing the tribunal 
from awarding lost profits, which it viewed as highly speculative, but a prospective loss 
on the contract did not appear to undermine the compensation for out of pocket costs, as 
it might well have in domestic American law had the loss been sufficiently established by 
the respondent45.    
Another ICSID tribunal considered the extent of recovery for investment-related 
expenses in Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. (Claimant) v Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela (Respondent)46 a dispute brought by a Venezuelan company 
against the Venezuelan government regarding a concession to build and improve a 
highway system connecting the city of Caracas to the coast which was financially 
hindered by the government’s decision to freeze highway toll rates due to a citizen 
uprising.  Venezuela argued that under the terms of the concession agreement, the 
                                                 
43
 MTD Equity Sdn Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. (Claimant) v Republic of Chile  
(Respondent)  FIND CITE FOR THIS AWARD  Paras 217, 240(ii). 25 May 2004, upheld following 
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awarded that will allow parties to escape the risk of bad bargains. 
46
 ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, 2003 WL 24070173 (APPAWD) 23 September 2003 
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respondent company could only claim out of pocket expenses incurred through activities 
that fulfilled the terms of the agreement.  Although the tribunal allowed the respondent to 
claim for lost profits as well (pointing to a more broadly phrased provision of the 
agreement allowing other heads of damages) the tribunal did state that with respect to the 
investment costs, only those out of pocket costs sustained under the terms of the contract 
could be compensated.  In order to ascertain which particular investment costs could be 
claimed, the tribunal examined financial statements prepared by the respondent company, 
which it viewed as presumptively reliable, noting however that an unexplained increase 
in recorded costs would not be recoverable.  Applying Venezuelan law, recovery of 
bidding costs was not permissible (although they were not in fact claimed) but 
negotiation costs were.  A loan extended by the claimant to an affiliate company was not 
viewed as a legitimate out of pocket expense because it could not be substantiated 
through the claimant’s expert’s uncertain testimony.  The tribunal ruled that although 
legal costs arising out of the highway project (apart from the ICSID arbitration itself) 
were the valid subject of a claim, only those costs incurred as a result of the respondent’s 
action could be recovered – not those involving litigation with private citizens who had 
disrupted the highway project.  As the claimant did not properly segregate these two 
categories of legal cost in its financial records, the tribunal awarded half of the claimant’s 
legal costs (an amount representing what the tribunal saw as the expenses relating to 
dealings with the Venezuelan government).  Costs of soil studies prepared by the 
claimant company in anticipation of the project were awarded, despite the fact that they 
were incomplete and had no current value to either party.  Administrative costs incurred 
regarding the ongoing operation of the highway project during the disruptions were 
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recoverable, although the tribunal discounted the claimant’s specified amount by 10% to 
reflect the tribunal’s impression that the amount was excessive and given the 
incompleteness of the expert’s report on this matter.  The total amount of out-of-pocket 
expenses awarded to the claimant company was just over 2 billion BS.47  Additional 
amounts were recovered for lost profits which were specifically allowed under the 
concession agreement, irrespective of any concurrent recovery for expenses. 
 Out of pocket expenses were examined by the tribunal in Southern Pacific 
Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt48 for a claim involving a 
Hong Kong company’s investments in tourist facilities near the Giza Pyramids and on the 
Mediterranean coast of Egypt which were later opposed by citizens because of concerns 
of damage to ancient sites and artifacts, resulting in the public expropriation of the 
designated land.  As an alternative to damages based upon the value of the investment 
project at the time of expropriation, the claimants requested compensation for out of 
pocket expenses, including a loan to an affiliated company, capital and development costs 
pre and post project cancellation administrative and legal costs.  The tribunal outlined the 
nature of these expenses:  
[C]onsiderable amounts of time and money were spent on negotiating, planning and 
implementing the project.  [The Claimant] made capital contributions and loans [to its 
affiliate] … these amounts must be reimbursed as part of … fair compensation …[W]hen 
the project was cancelled, construction was under way and considerable marketing 
activity had been carried out.  Most of the detailed engineering design and specifications 
for the first phase … had been completed. A construction contract had been concluded 
for the infrastructure, construction had begun and lot sales had commenced. To the extent 
that the expenses associated with this activity have been proven … reimbursement of 
such expenses is also part of … fair compensation…49 
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 Bolivars, the Venezuelan currency. 
48
 CASE NO. ARB/84/3 20 May 1992; 32 I.L.M. 933 (1993)  
49
 At 198. 
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Recoverable development costs were further elaborated upon to include allocation of 
salaries, travel and entertainment expenses of executives, recruitment and relocation of 
personnel as well as consultations for marketing and banking.  Again, the recovery of 
these amounts was contingent upon the production of documentation detailing the 
specific nature, date and amount of expense incurred in order to confirm that they were 
legitimately related and directly connected to the project.  Such expenses were viewed by 
the tribunal as irrecoverable losses because of the cancellation of the tourist development 
project.  It is significant that the tribunal did deny recovery for any investment expenses 
that could not be verified through proper documentation, including those where the 
individual payee could not be identified.  Strangely, the tribunal also included litigation 
costs associated with its own procedure as legitimate “out of pocket” expenses that 
should be compensated in order to make whole the party who had suffered the loss.50  
This does not appear to fit with the American concept of detrimental reliance as litigation 
costs are not incurred for the purpose of performing the contractual obligation. The 
Southern Pacific tribunal also interestingly distinguished between ordinary out of pocket 
expenses and those involving the costs of lost opportunity in making a commercial 
success of the project, illustrating that the parity between the concepts of damnum 
emergens and reliance is not absolute.51  Most significantly, the tribunal noted that the 
appropriate situation in which reliance-based damages should be awarded is when the 
value of the investment at the time of expropriation is either nil or less than the out of 
pocket expenses.52  As discussed earlier, this is the exact opposite of American common 
law which denies reliance-based recovery where there would have been a loss in 
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 At 207-208. 
51
 See earlier footnote FULLER AND PURDUE.  Reliance would not typically award opportunity costs. 
52
 At 214 
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performance53. The tribunal’s logic is unclear here as damages should not be awarded in 
an amount that enables party’s to avoid the natural risk of bad bargains.  In Southern 
Pacific, the investment value at the time of expropriation of the project was determined to 
be more than the previously calculated out of pocket expenses.  The tribunal 
consequently awarded the difference between the value of the project at expropriation 
and the investment costs in addition to the previously calculated out of pocket expenses 
(approximately US $3M)54. 
 In the Amco Asia v Indonesia case regarding the nationalization of a hotel 
apartment complex, the ICSID tribunal criticized the asserted method of Net Book Value 
of invested assets as a means of ascertaining the extent of expenditures, noting that this 
method had typically been used in international law where compensation for prospective 
earnings was unavailable for some reason, such as a legislative bar to profit-based 
recovery in the law of the host state.55  While a full treatment of asset valuation 
methodology is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that it is unfortunate 
that no precise definition of the concept of Net Book Value was given by the tribunal, 
other than the somewhat unhelpful “assets minus liability.”56 Further elaboration would 
have been illuminating because of the important role that depreciation necessarily plays 
in the valuation of reliance based expenditures.  One would expect that capital assets 
                                                 
53
 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS par 121.D citing Bausch & Lomb v Bressler, 977 F 2d 720 (2d Cir. 1992).   
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(Claimant) v Argentine Republic (Respondent) ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 AWARD, 6 Feb 2007 at 355.   
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purchased for the purpose of an investment which is subsequently expropriated should be 
assessed by their initial cost but rather diminished according to the decline in the asset’s 
value over their use i.e. during the profit-earning period prior to the termination of the 
investment due to expropriation, otherwise over-compensation will result. Without 
addressing this important issue directly, the tribunal concluded that Book Value 
methodology was inappropriate with respect to certain types of assets, such as long-term 
contractual rights, ultimately preferring to focus on projected future profits as the 
measure of damages, which it ascertained using Discounted Cash Flow analysis.57  
Interestingly the tribunal noted that the value of physical assets will also inform the result 
of a future profit analysis, however the approach is not always appropriate:  
 
… the value of the physical assets lost by the investor due to the taking of the investment 
is added to the discounted cash flow in order to assess the total amount of the damages 
...[but] this method might raise serious problems in cases where at the end of the 
contractual relationship (or of the legal relationship comparable to a contractual one), the 
injured party would not have been entitled to keep valuable goods previously utilized for 
the operation of the business. Moreover, the value of physical assets thus utilized is itself 
essentially based on the earnings that such utilization may yield; therefore, the valuation 
of the net cash flow may well reflect the commercial value of the physical assets.58 
 
 
The conclusion here appears to be that a future profit analysis may perhaps paradoxically 
be the best way to assess a past-investment based loss.  Other ICSID tribunals have 
observed this difficult aspect of valuation. This is seen in the concepts of Net Present 
Cash Flow, which attempts to fix a current value of the investment according to the 
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projected value of lost future business.  Indeed the complexities of the various accounting 
measures leads one to question the rigidity of the boundaries between the simple 
categories of reliance and expectation based damages, which may well be the reason that 
both lucrum cessans and damnum emergens are typically argued by the claimants in 
ICSID arbitrations.   
 Claimant Azurix asserted that the extent of its compensation for the expropriation 
of its water concession by Argentina should based on the actual investment method and 
the tribunal felt that this method was appropriate because the investment in question “is 
recent and highly ascertainable.”59  This case is worthy of recognition because the 
tribunal was concerned that the “aggressive” price paid for the concession by the 
claimant was excessive compared to other bids.  The tribunal held that in fact no well 
informed investor would have paid such a high amount based on the modest estimated 
revenues of the project.  Consequently, gauging damages according to amounts invested 
is not always a sensible approach because such amounts may be commercially 
unreasonable in the circumstances.  In awarding compensation for investment costs based 
on an amount that an independent well-informed third party would have paid for the 
concession, which was substantially less than what the claimant actually paid, the tribunal 
appeared to be merely reiterating a familiar aspect of the reliance remedy: damages will 
be recovered for the costs of performance reasonably incurred. 
 Although the text of the ICSID awards is not always clear on the point, it must be 
emphasized that while the tribunal permits recovery for both lost investments and lost 
profits, it does not permit double recovery (costs and profit) for the same items, which 
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 Azurix Corp. (Claimant) v Argentine republic (Respondent)  ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1 (Award) at 425 
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would result in costless gain for any investment and which would be invidious even for 
the lowest risk commercial activities.  In order to avoid double recovery the amount 
awarded for lost profits must be reduced by the investment amount such that 
compensation for lost profits is always net.60 The adjustment of investment-based 
compensation because of an award for future profits was seen in Liberian Eastern Timber 
Corporation [LETCO] (Claimant) v Republic of Liberia61, a dispute involving a 
concession agreement for the harvesting of forest products.  Here the tribunal explicitly 
reduced the recovery for investment in infrastructure, machinery and equipment because 
that amount had already been included in the calculation of net profit i.e. the figure for 
expected profit was derived from gross income expected minus costs incurred.  The only 
investment cost that was not reduced in this way was a bank penalty on a loan, taken out 
for the purposes of the investment, that was imposed because of Liberia’s interference 
with the project.  Although the concept of “profit” necessarily means net rather than total 
gain, this is not always apparent when ICSID awards include both lost future income and 
out of pocket expenses.  It is often necessary to review the tabulated amounts at the end 
of the award, rather than the text of the judgment in order for this understanding to 
emerge. 
 
Efficiency Goals of ICSID Awards 
The cases discussed above divulge very little reasoning with respect to the selection of 
cost-based damages other than the concern for achieving accuracy, primarily by avoiding 
the prediction of uncertain future profits based on unverifiable evidence.  That there is 
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little economic analysis of investment law62 and certainly none that has focused on ICSID 
is surprising because although the ICSID tribunals do not attempt to justify their 
decisions on efficiency grounds, the selection of remedies in this manner is grounded in 
economic theory.  Put simply, compensation based upon amounts actually invested are 
chosen by ICSID tribunals because such awards serve the obvious function of reducing 
error costs. 
Courts and tribunals suffer from a deficiency in information regarding laws or 
facts which results in mistakes when applying substantive legal principles.  One of the 
most common mistakes on the part of adjudicatory bodies is their failure to assess the 
quantum of damages accurately such that a breach of contract (or a tortious injury) is 
properly compensated.  With perfect information available, a court will be able to craft a 
perfect remedy (which is often seen as the level at which the injured party would be 
indifferent between performance and breach or injury and cash)63, but as this is a logical 
impossibility, courts must seek a second-best alternative, which is to apply as much 
information (facts and law) as possible without the transaction cost of evaluating this 
information exceeding the advantage of accuracy in pronouncing a judgment.  Thus in 
their attempt to minimize error costs (the inevitable failure to select a perfectly accurate 
judgment), courts are compelled to craft remedies based on the most reliable available 
information.64 In each of the ICSID cases discussed above there was a large quantity of 
cost-oriented information readily available to the tribunal in the form of expert testimony 
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or financial records which can be readily applied to tailor a remedy that approximates 
perfection. Were a profit-focused or expectation type standard pursued then this 
information would have less utility (or even none), raising the risk of adjudicative errors 
because of the consequential reliance on predictive modeling.  However, it must be 
recognized that the provision and examination of extensive cost-based evidence also 
represents a process cost to the disputants that could ultimately result in resistance 
against the use of ICSID as a means of adjudicating disputes.  In contrast, the tribunal’s 
determination of future profits appears to involve essentially the application of one or 
more formulae to historical revenue data, an exercise which entails a much diminished 
(and less costly) evidentiary consideration than the assessment of numerous individual 
assets.65    
 In addition to the error costs borne by the parties to arbitration associated with a 
tribunal’s failure to set an appropriate remedy, there are also social costs that result from 
the imposition of an imperfect remedy.  These are the distortions in incentives that result 
from either over-compensation or under-compensation of an injury resulting from an 
expropriation or broken investment agreement.66  If the injured company is compensated 
below the level of perfection, then other companies will be reluctant to engage in foreign 
direct investment in the future – which as we have seen is one of the purposes of the 
ICSID Convention.67  Merrils has suggested, however, that the failure to compensate an 
investor fully may result in positive incentives: foreign firms may be discouraged from 
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engaging in investments that are harmful to the foreign state in case such actions result in 
a regulatory response from that state.68 If an injured company is over-compensated, this 
might be viewed as an interference with a state’s sovereign right to nationalize its own 
industry in the interest of its people.  An excessive damages award will then undermine 
the political legitimacy of investment arbitration.69 Moral hazard may also ensue – as 
investors will allocate the risk of their investments to the respondent state during dispute 
settlement.70 Over-compensating investors may give them the perverse incentive to act 
irresponsibly71 for example, by engaging in activities which although profitable, are 
damaging to the local environment. Furthermore, with excessive damages, host states will 
be discouraged from terminating economically wasteful projects where to do so would be 
efficient, a so-called “efficient breach”.72 The important point is that in order for a state to 
engage in a rational assessment of efficiency it will need to be able to calculate ex ante 
the costs of breach and compare them to the cost of compliance.73  The readily 
discernable, or at least estimable, nature of actual investment costs (again as opposed to 
estimated future profits) thus represents an attractive remedy from an incentive 
perspective. Such incentive effects are particularly acute even for a private tribunal like 
ICSID as most of its cases are now disseminated on the internet and in case reporters and 
many disputes now receive extensive media coverage.  
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Although again not directly referenced in any ICSID cases, reliance based 
damages may be preferable from an efficiency perspective because the proof of 
expectation damages based upon projected profits may require the innocent party to 
divulge potentially sensitive information about their own internal business strategy,74 
unlike investment related information such as labor and equipment costs.  Obviating the 
need to disclose profit information would assuage some of the confidentiality concerns 
that have cultivated ICSID members’ reluctance to publish all awards in their entirety and 
in so doing lessen the widespread disdain for the forum from the international community 
because of its lack of transparency.  Increased transparency of ICSID awards is of vital 
importance with respect to the integrity of the arbitral process, the confidence of its users 
in the system and most importantly from an economic standpoint – the effectiveness of 
ICSID in encouraging foreign investment.75 Since both confidentiality and transparency 
of the proceedings are highly desirable features of international commercial arbitration, 
remedies that facilitate both objectives should be pursued.  Whereas information 
regarding lost profits might expose investors to unwanted scrutiny from competitors, 
actual expenditures would do little more than demonstrate the business acumen 
associated with a past project.   
 
Suitability of Reliance-Based Remedies  
The appropriateness of reliance based compensation may depend on whether the 
injurious behavior was the result of an expropriation or for violations of the fair and 
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equitable treatment standard, as the former terminates an investment whereas the latter 
may still permit ongoing business activity.76  In the case of an expropriation, an award of 
lost profits may be more appropriate because this will represent the most investor-
friendly approximation of the injuries sustained and an award of something less than 
anticipated missed profits from the seized investment will represent incomplete 
compensation.  If the investment activity continues, however, with some unfair treatment 
from the host state falling short of expropriation, then an award of profits could well 
represent a double-recovery given that some profit may be maintained.  The difficulty in 
fixing compensation for breaches of the fair and equitable treatment standard are 
exacerbated by the lack of reference to compensation for such injuries in treaty language 
(in contrast to expropriation) and consequently compensation for such violations will 
often depend on the circumstances of each dispute.77   
Some commentators have criticized the application of contract law’s somewhat 
rigid categorization of heads of damage to the arena of international investment in part 
because of this concern for double-recovery engendered by the application of both 
damnum emergens and lucrum cessans to activities that comprise both individualized 
assets and future income streams,78 however as suggested above, double recovery should 
be prevented by the application of a net rather than gross profit determination, which one 
might expect would amount to lucrum cessans minus damnum emergens rather than in 
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addition to it – although of course any formula including both heads would require twice 
the resources in calculation (process costs) and a corresponding increase in error 
potential. Clearly the circumstances of each case will dictate the optimal remedial 
approach, which will take into account the risks of under and over-compensation as noted 
above.   
Assessing damages in investment arbitration on the basis of amount of investment 
has been recommended by Wells because this measure is likely to approximate full 
market value, at least in the case of recently acquired assets.79 It is significant that none of 
the ICSID cases discussed herein considered recovery for the actual investment costs of 
intangibles such as business goodwill, customer loyalty or reputation.  The use of the 
damnum emergens measure in the investment context has been condemned for its 
inability to address such losses, as well as for failing to account for incremental increases 
in value for development activities in an unfinished project beyond their initial 
acquisition cost.80   However, this objection represents more so a criticism of individual 
asset valuation methodology rather than the standard of compensation, an often blurred 
distinction that must be kept in mind during the remedy stage of an award.  Once the 
various expenses for which damages will be paid have been identified via a standard of 
compensation, the evaluation process operates as a separate and very complex aspect of 
ICSID adjudication.  Commentators have observed that arriving at a precise valuation of 
damages in investment disputes is a much more difficult task than merely establishing the 
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standard to be applied.81  Although not properly the subject of this article, we have seen 
some indication in the application of the reliance measure that a wide range of valuation 
methods are used by ICSID.  Indeed a flexible interplay of many methods has been 
advocated by commentators.82  In quantifying the precise value of an investment (via 
whatever head of damage) the tribunal has stated that its methodology and reasoning 
should be fully transparent.83  Unfortunately the preceding examination of some limited 
ICSID case law has shown that there is very little explanation offered as to the precise 
methodology of evaluation of actual investment-based compensation.  This general 
shortcoming of international arbitration has been acknowledged by commentators84 and 
remains a legitimate grievance of disputants at ICSID as well as those in the academic 
community.  
 It is difficult to discern any instructive jurisprudence from ICSID cases regarding 
awards of actual investment costs, other than the indisputable assertion that they are more 
likely to be implemented when future profits are highly indeterminate.  In addition to the 
stipulation of actual investment recovery in an investment contract or BIT, we can 
conclude also that detailed, verifiable financial statements are essential to the success of a 
claim for actual investment losses.  ICSID awards are manifestly fact-oriented and it 
would not be far wrong to characterize ICSID tribunals as essentially fact finding bodies.  
This statement is intended to be descriptive rather than judgmental.  The extent to which 
the tribunal focuses on the evidence tendered by the parties for the purposes of assessing 
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damages for nationalization claims should be familiar to American observers, as the 
process of adducing financial evidence for the purposes of valuation, often with the aid of 
expert testimony, has been compared to that of domestic American takings litigation 
under the US Constitution.85  One must also recall that the under the ICSID Convention, 
the tribunals are empowered with the total discretion in deciding on the relevance and 
admissibility of evidence adduced by the parties, as well as in exercising the power to 
request further information.86  This is the type of adjudication that contracting members 
assent to by virtue of their ratification of the Convention. 
The attempt to subject assessment of damages in international arbitration to 
general rules of law has been opposed in favor of a more pragmatic approach based on, 
inter alia, the relationship between the parties.87  Such remedial flexibility is particularly 
important in disputes that are essentially fact-based.88  While remedial flexibility is a 
worthwhile objective, the process must have determinacy, which is the perhaps the most 
appealing feature of reliance-based measures, even if fair compensation is ultimately 
compromised.  Complete compensation may not always be the most desirable goal.  
Indeed international investment law has shown a trend towards partial compensation for 
many types of takings by foreign states, such as those which are lawful or those where 
the investor had adopted bad industry practices.89 
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Conclusion 
Gray has termed the quest for a single method of calculating compensation for breach of 
international contracts “a chimera that has been obsessively pursued by many scholars”90  
and this article has by no means attempted to suggest that it has found the answer in 
relation to international investment arbitration.  Rather than abandon the common law of 
contract’s preference for lost profit-based compensation, this article has demonstrated 
that ICSID’s occasional recourse to actual investment losses is a suitable compliment to 
expectation-oriented damages, and one that is, perhaps unknowingly, based upon 
principles of efficiency.  In addition to reducing error costs of faulty compensation 
because of evidentiary reliability, and the associated incentives engendered therein, 
reliance-based awards at ICSID will also serve to enhance confidentiality without 
impeding transparency.  ICSID’s use of  damnum emergens may reflect its willingness to 
escalate the process costs of adjudication through voluminous but verifiable evidence 
rather than risk raising the error costs of faulty judgments based on uncertain 
expectations.  Given the generally efficient incentives that should ensue from the 
application of this “safer” measure, the observed application of reliance based damages at 
ICSID should be applauded and other international fora should be urged to follow suit. 
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